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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff a.nd Respondenl,
-vs.-

IRENE HEDGEBETH and
HENRY ALLEN,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case
No. 9299

BRIEF OF RESPO,NDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not dispute the statement of facts
set forth in appellants' brief.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECEIVING
INTO EVIDENCE STATE'S EXHIBITS A, B, C,
D AND E.
PoiNT

II.
DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT A WITNESS IS CREDIBLE IS THE FUNCTION OF A
PoiNT

1
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JURY . AND IS . NOT REVIEWABLE BY THh:
APPELLATE COURT.

III.
THE RECORD DOES NOT INDICATE THAT
THE OGDEN CITY POLICE WERE ANY MORE
BIASED OR PREJUDICED THAN ORDINARY
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS.
PoiNT

PoiNT

IV.

IF THERE WAS ERROR IN RECEIPT OF
STATE'S EXHIBITS A, B, C, D AND E, IT WAS
NOT PREJUDICIAL.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECEIVING
INTO EVIDENCE STATE'S EXHIBITS A, B, C,
D AND E.

(a) The initial objection raised by defendants is that
State's Exhibit A, a wallet, was received into evidence
'vithout clarifying whether it was found on Friday, January 8, 1960, or Saturday, January 9, 1960. The pertinent
part of the transcript is as follows :

''!Q. Mrs. Checketts, I '11 call your attention to the
morning of January 8th just at about 10 :30
a.m. of that day and ask you whether or not
you had oc.acsion to go downtown here in
Ogden.
A. I go downtown every Saturday morning and
purchase my groceries and do any other shopping I need to, and I left home about 10:30MR. HENDRICKS:

2

(interposing A.M. or P.M. Y
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A. A.M. No grocery stores are open around town
at 10 p.m.

Q. Mrs. Checketts, did you later in the day return
to your home~
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Approximately what time~

A. Around a quarter after twelve at noon.

Q. And did you at that time have occasion to go
to your back yard, Mrs. Checketts~
A. Yes, I go to the back door and open it so my
husband can bring the groceries in through it.

Q. On this occasion as you entered your apartment on the 9th, did you find anything that appeared to be unusual~
A. As I opened the back door (interposing) Object to the
leading questions. * * * ''
MR. HENDRICKS:

It is true that the prosecuting attorney framed his intial
question concerning the date using January 8, 1960. The
witness, however, answered that she went downtown
every Saturday (which would have been January 9, 1960)
without mentioning the day of the month. The prosecution later corrected the mistake when he questioned the
witness about when she entered her apartment on Jannary 9th. ( Tr. 27)
It is improbable that a natural and innocuous slip
caused any confusion in the minds of the jury. Defendants' attorney was present and did not correct the error;
in fact, he did not even cross-examine the witness.
3
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The testimony of Officer Butcher later in the trial
( Tr. 45) also indicated that the wallet was found on the
9th of January, 1960.
(b) The Trial Judge did not err in receiving Exhibit
B in evidence. The exhibit, a cigarette lighter, was relevant as it tended to establish a material proposition.
Admitting this exhibit could not have aroused the jury's
emotions of prejudice nor created a side issue to mislead
the jury. A fair standard for determining the relevancy
of evidence is set out by McCormick on Evidence ( Ch. 16,
para 152, p. 318) :
''Does the evidence render the inference more
probable than it would be without the evidence~"
Further as to the standard a judge should use in making
the determination, McCormick states:
''The answer must filter through the judge's experience, his judgment and his knowledge of
human conduct and motivation."
In Thompson v. American Steel and Wire Company,
317 Pa. 7, 11, 175 A. 541, 1934, the court stated, speaking
of the Judge :
''He is constantly faced 'Yith questions on evidence in their special relation to the issue to be
tried. He must deal with such questions in the
light of the purposes of the ultimate inquiry and
does so in the exercise of "~hat is known as judicial discretion. He should see that nothing relevant is excluded so long as its admission will not
unduly distract the attention of the jury from the
main inquiry by first requiring the ascertainment
4
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of an unnecessary quantity of subordinate facts
from which the main inference would ultimately be
made. His conclusion or decision on such points
will not be interfered with on appeal save for
manifest abuse of power.''
Although the complaining witness, Mr. Israelson, was
unable to identify positively the cigarette lighter, admission of it as an exhibit was not prejudicial as it was used
to show that at the time of the defendant, Henry Allen's,
arrest, he had a lighter which was at least similar to the
one taken from the complaining witness. The Court's
decision to receive Exhibit B was made in the exercise of
judicial discretion and the record does not indicate the
Judge abused his power in any way.
(c) It is true that Officer Gill failed to identify Exhibit C or his initials thereon. However, Officer Butcher
'vas present when Officer Gill obtained the bottle and
initialed it, and a.t the trial identified the bottle by the
initials of Officer Gill. Exhibit D, the beer bottle, could
have been more precisely identified; nevertheless, Officer
Butcher was present when the beer bottle was found in
the apartment, and so testified. Since the bottle was
introduced merely to show that a beer bottle was found
in the apartment, it was not error to receive it.
(d) Whether or not scientific detection was used
is not applicable on review, as this matter would go to
the weight of the evidence and would not affect the admissibility as long as reasonable methods were followed. This
is especially true where an attempt to obtain fingerprints
was not made immediately after taking the exhibit into

5
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custody. Th~ fact that Lt. Carver did not receive the
exhibit until January 11, 1960, appears to have little
impact in determining if scientific detection was used.

PoiNT

II.

DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT A WITNESS IS CREDIBLE IS THE FUNCTION OF A
JURY AND IS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE
APPELLATE COURT.
The appellate court should not pass on the credibility
of witnesses as this is a question solely for the determination of the jury or the trial court in cases tried without a
jury, the reason being that the jury or judge who see and
hear witnesses testify have an opportunity to observe
their demeanor and appearance and are in a better position to determine the credibility. In Gittens v. Lundberg,
284 P. 2d 1115, 3 U. 2d 392, the court stated :
"It is the duty of this court to leave the question
of credibility of witnesses to the jury as fact trier
and we have quite consistently adhered to that
policy. As has often been said, the jury is in a.
favorable position to form impressions as to the
trust to be reposed in witnesses. They have the
advantage of fairly close personal contact; the
opportunity to observe appearances and general
demeanor; and the chance to feel the impact of
personality, all of which they may consider in connection with the reactions, manner, approaches
and apparent frankness and candor or want of it in
reacting to and answering questions on both direct
and cross examination in determining whether and
to what extent witnesses are to be believed.''

6
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PoiNT

III.

THE RECORD DOES NOT INDICATE THAT
THE OGDEN CITY POLICE WERE ANY MORE
BIASED OR PREJUDICED THAN ORDINARY
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS.
Defendants imply that arresting defendants prior to
finding Exhibit A, the wallet, was improper and that this
act prejudiced defendants. This position is untenable.
The record before the Court contains nothing which even
suggests that finding the wallet was the justification for
defendants' arrest. The fact that the wallet was the only
exhibit at the preliminary hearing has no bearing on the
arrest. Defendants' statements regarding the enmity
between the defendants and Officer Butcher is an extraneous issue and is outside the scope of this appeal as this
issue was not raised in the trial court. While it is admitted
that certain procedures of the investigating officers could
have been improved, there is nothing in the record which
indjcates that the defendants have been preudiced. Volume 30, C. J. S., Sec. 103lb, page 1073, sets forth the general law on bias as follows :
''The interest or bias of a witness, or the absence
thereof, may be considered as affecting the weight
of his testimony, the weight of the testimony of an
intereste witness, depending largely on the facts
in each case. So where a party testifies as a witthe cause may
ness his interest in the outcome
and should be considered in determining probative value of his testimony. However, the interest
or bias of a witness does not ipso fact wholly deprive his testimony of probative force.''

or
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7

IV.
IF THERE WAS ERROR IN RECEIPT OF
STATE'S EXHffiiTS A, B, C, D AND E, IT WAS
NOT PREJUDICIAL.
PoiNT

5A C. J. S., para. 1724, page 945, states:
''A judgment will not be reversed because of the
erroneous admission of evidence where it did not,
or probably did not, affect the result, conclusion,
udgment or verdict or could not have done so, or
was not reasonably calculated to cause a result
unfair to the complaining party or was not of such
a character to reasonably tend to cause the rendition of an improper verdict or could not have
materially affected decisive issues, or could not
have misled, confused, influenced or prejudiced
the minds of the jury.''
Respondent contends that there was no error in receiving the exhibits in question, but if there were, defendants have not been prejudiced. In the case of the wallet,
had the jury believed it had been found the day prior to
the incident, the respondent's case certaintly would have
been weakened, which would have been advantageous to
the defendants. The bottles were not properly identified
by the particular officer who marked them; however,
Officer Butcher did testify that he was present and that
he and Officer Gill jointly obtained the bottles. There
was no positive identification of the cigarette lighter and
the attorney for the defendants called this fact to the
jury's attention. Receiving the money as evidence had
probative value and was used only for the purpose of
showing that one of the defendants had money on his
person.

8
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CONCLUSION
The record on appeal does not indicate that any of
the evidence admitted unlawfully prejudiced the defendants. The latter, entirely within their rights, failed to
testify, thereby waiving an opportunity to clarify any
issue which might have been offensive to their position.
There appears to be some question as to the force used
against Israelson and as to whether or not he was actually
placed in fear, and also as to his sobriety on the evening
in question. However, we do not feel that the Court committed prejudicial error in its conduct of the trial and it is
the function of the jury to make its decision as to
guilt or innocence.
Respectfully submitted
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
CLARENCE J. FROST
Assista;n.t Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent
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